Chapter VIII: The Hawaiian Defenses After Pearl Harbor
What do you know, Hawaii is back in the spotlight yet again! This time around we have found one of the cleanest EG hatches from the islands (as far as we. Another reason for the Army's more cautious stand may be found in doubts . staff, and espionage of sorts by one other person, a German national named Otto Kuehn. . meeting in Washington that all Japanese aliens in the Hawaiian Islands. The world tour of King Kalākaua of the Kingdom of Hawaii was his His efforts brought the small island nation to the attention of world leaders, but Although troubled by the rumors and by Blaine's stance on annexation, none of them.
The state dinner in his honor hosted by President Ulysses S. Grant was the first White House state dinner ever given. The estimated population of Native Hawaiians when Cook arrived wasWith the arrival of whaling ships and missionaries in the early 19th century, the Native Hawaiians were exposed to diseases for which they had no immunity and began dying in large numbers.
The official census showed only 44, individuals who claimed Hawaiian ethnicity. On December 24,he signed an act of the legislative assembly acknowledging corruption in the immigration system and authorizing Minister of the Interior Henry A. Carter to take charge of licensing immigration brokers. GreenMinister of Foreign Affairsfollowed up with a communique to Hawaii's consulates stating the goals for the tour. Her assertion was that the " missionary party " tried to exert its control by insisting that she only be allowed to be in charge of a temporary council and that all decisions in the King's absence were to be made by the entire council.
She balked at the suggestion and demanded that her regency have full royal power; he agreed. As the King made his way onto the ship, many in the crowd at the dock reached out to touch him. Macfarlanehis aide-de-campwould accompany them as far as California. The intent was to give the impression of a personal vacation, thereby avoiding the large costly retinue required for official business. The Royal Hawaiian Bandthe Hawaiian army, and a large contingent of well-wishers bid them farewell as the City of Sydney sailed out.
They were accompanied in California's capital by Governor George Clement Perkinssugar baron Claus Spreckelsand water engineer Hermann Schusslerwho had worked on several projects in Hawaii.
It was Armstrong who delivered the after-dinner speech and offered a toast to continued good relations with the Chinese population in Hawaii. March 4 — June 7[ edit ] Japan: March 4—18[ edit ] Col. They had not given advance notice to the Japanese government of their pending visit, but the government had been alerted by a telegraph from the Imperial General Consul in San Francisco. They were formally welcomed at the Tokyo Imperial Palace and taken to Shintomiza, the Imperial Theatreto be entertained by a kabuki drama.
The following day Emperor Meiji held a state dinner for his visitors. The Emperor presented the King with two suits of Japanese armorand bestowed upon him the Order of the Chrysanthemum with Badge, and the Star of the Order.
The King reciprocated with a royal painting of Queen Kapiolani and himself, and presented the Emperor with the Grand Cross of Kamehameha.
A ball was planned in the king's honor by the Masonic Fraternity of Yokohama, which he bowed out of when he learned of the assassination of Alexander II of Russia. On March 22, they embarked on the steamship Tokio Maru bound for Shanghai. I felt as if I would have a continual longing to see this interesting country with its kind and hospitable inhabitants for a long long time.
Aloha Nui — China: March 25 — April 9[ edit ] Li Hung Chang The Chinese had been a part of Hawaii's culture since the late 18th century, when the islands were first visited by Chinese merchants and tradesmen.
Insugar plantations began recruiting unskilled labor from China. Because these men initially intended to return to China upon the completion of their contracts, most came without families. The Viceroy responded favorably and agreed to co-sponsor such an emigration with the Hawaiian government.
Kalākaua's 1881 world tour
The royal party returned to Shanghai on April 6. They sailed out of China the next day. Armstrong delivered the after-dinner speech. Judd was voted into the masonry brotherhood at the latter, Lodge No. April 26—30[ edit ] The steamship Killarney arrived in Bangkok on April Upon arrival, they were carried aboard a royal yacht up the Menam River to Bangkok. From there, they were carried on silk chairs to one of the many palaces in Bangkok for the duration of their visit.
He included a lengthy list of decorations to be sent to various members of the Siamese nobility. As the ship sailed away, they were bid farewell by a military gun salute, and shouts of approval by well-wishers at the dock. Nevertheless, Governor Frederick Weld held a formal reception and state dinner for him. They squared off in the Sultan's palace over a billiard table.
They departed on May May 28 — June 7[ edit ] Several plantation owners in Hawaii favored the importation of coolie labor from the East India region. Carter and British consul James Hay Wodehouse had already visited England in to open a door for the process. They were discouraged by stipulations that Hawaii would be forced to pass legislation that would in essence be a detailed labor contract. There was a further requirement that such a Hawaiian law could not be changed without the approval of the governments of both Great Britain and East India.
The prospect was explored through the end ofwhen Hawaii's immigration board decided the islands could not import Indian labor within the parameters required. Their trip across the British India subcontinent was a sightseeing excursion during their last days before sailing to the Middle Eastand they stopped to tour the Ellora Caves prior to reaching Bombay.
There was more in Bombay to interest him: All was not lost, since he and the estimated 70 other passengers passed the week playing games and dancing. With no existing treaty with Egypt, they were pleasantly surprised by Khedive Tewfik Pasha 's offer of his Cairo palace during their stay, accommodating them with a tour of the Pyramid complex and the Great Sphinx on the Giza Plateau.
Except for the heavy bomber units, the  actual control of Army forces in Hawaii continued to be exercised by the Hawaiian Department and successor commands, under missions assigned by the Navy. There would undoubtedly have been a closer- integration of command if the local Army and Navy commanders had complied with a Washington order of 19 December to establish a joint command post; but it took them a year to agree on its location, and after another year spent in construction they agreed that a joint command post was no longer needed.
The separate Army and Navy command headquarters continued to coordinate their work through liaison officers, as they had done before Pearl Harbor, albeit more effectively. Nothing like a unified force evolved in Hawaii, and indeed for the first few months there was much rivalry and friction between the services.
But at the top General Emmons and Admiral Nimitz worked in close accord from the beginning, and by Maywhen the enemy again threatened in force, the Hawaiian defense forces were fairly joined if not united. The improvised and unsuccessful attempts of 7 December to locate the Japanese Striking Force were succeeded as rapidly as possible by an organized daily search under the command of the Navy's Patrol Wing Two using as many Army and Navy planes as could be made available, to a distance of nautical miles in all directions.
To make this patrol possible the Navy transferred three squadrons of reconnaissance craft from the Atlantic as quickly as it could.
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The Navy's reconnaissance plan that became effective during December called for a daily search by 46 planes, but in practice only 37 were normally used B's and 25 Navy PBY's. The Army managed to hold back 18 of its heavy bombers as a striking force ready for action on minute notice. The reconnaissance, though far superior to anything attempted before Pearl Harbor, was admittedly a good deal less than perfect- low visibility in the patrolled lanes could cut its effectiveness to near zero, and about one-fifth of the circle surrounding the islands had to be left virtually unpatrolled each day.
To make the patrol fully effective would not only require a good many more planes but also radar to eliminate the hazards of visual observation.
They kept a group of about nine submarines in the vicinity of Hawaii until mid January, to do what damage they could. As commerce destroyers Japanese submarines in Hawaiian waters proved as ineffective as they did on the west coast. Fliers returning to the carriers on 7 December had reported as best they could on what they had seen and photographed through flame and smoke, but the Japanese wanted a better picture.
To get one, a plane launched from submarine flew over Pearl Harbor at dawn on 18 December. During the night of December, submarines engaged in similar and nearly simultaneous shellings of Hilo on Hawaii, Nawiliwili on Kauai, and again on Kahului. At the last-named point Army coast artillery guns returned the fire. Damage at all three points was slight, and no one was hurt.
The principal result of these shellings was to stir up the war consciousness of all the Hawaiian Islands. In Hawaii a prewar allocation of responsibility for controlling enemy aliens in the event of war, the establishment of martial law, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus gave the Army almost plenary authority over both citizens and aliens.
There were, therefore, no legal barriers to prevent the Army from handling the large Japanese minority in the islands as it wished, but there were other factors-among them the Hawaiian climate of racial tolerance, the fact that most of the pressure for mass evacuation came from outside the Army, and the vital position of the Japanese in the civilian labor force-which operated as powerful checks on proposals to move a large part of the Japanese population from Oahu to another island or the mainland.
As in the continental United States, they had compiled lists of individual aliens who they assumed might be disloyal in wartime. They had also launched a campaign in the summer of to assure the Japanese population that if it remained loyal to the United States in a war with Japan it would be accorded fair treatment.
On 21 December General Emmons publicly renewed this pledge-after careful investigation had disclosed that there had been no sabotage and with one exception no other hostile act committed by either alien or citizen Japanese either during or after the Pearl Harbor Attack.
Specifically at his request, the War Department on 10 January asked the Hawaiian commander whether it would be practicable to move the Japanese population from Oahu to some other island.
General Emmons  answered that such a move would be highly dangerous and impractical. It would require a large amount of additional construction and building materials at a time when construction and shipping facilities were already taxed to their utmost; it would require many additional troops to guard the island at a time when the Hawaiian garrison had less than half the troops needed for missions already assigned; and it would gravely disrupt the economy of Oahu which, General Emmons estimated, had a Japanese population of20, aliens and 98, citizens that provided the bulk of the island's skilled labor.
Although General Emmons expressed little faith in the loyalty of the majority of the Japanese population in the event of an invasion, he believed the Japanese indispensable unless they could be replaced by an equivalent labor force from the mainland.
The general strongly recommended that, if the War Department decided that any or all of the Japanese had to be evacuated, they be moved to the continental United States. After the meeting Secretary Stimson told General Marshall of his concern over the situation, and the Chief of Staff instructed the War Plans Division to look into the matter and make recommendations.Hawaii Islands - Tour 4K 2016
He also assured the War Department that "if an assault were made on Oahu before transfer of sufficient number of Nipponese, we have ready plans to immobilize the Japanese. He again pointed out that the bulk of skilled labor on Oahu was of Japanese descent and could not possibly be replaced by civilians or soldiers already there. The President responded to Secretary Knox as follows: Like you, I have long felt that most of the Japanese should be removed from Oahu to one of the other Islands.
This involves much planning, much temporary construction and careful supervision of them when they get to the new location. I do not worry about the constitutional question-first, because of my recent order [Executive Order ] and, second, because Hawaii is under martial law.
The whole matter is one of immediate and present war emergency. I think you and Stimson can agree and then go ahead and do it as a military project.
Both General Marshall and Secretary Stimson approved the War Plans proposal, which contemplated the eventual transfer of aboutJapanese aliens and citizens from Hawaii to the mainland for internment or resettlement, and Secretary Stimson carried a  brief of the Army's plan to a Cabinet meeting on 27 February. Stimson recorded the Cabinet discussions as follows: Removal of Japs from Oahu.
Knox brought this up and urged vigorously the remedy of the situation out there. I told them that the Army concurred in this but that for the reasons given in Marshall's memorandum [that is, the latest War Plans recommendation] it would probably be necessary to send them to the United States. The President was staggered by this and was rather plainly in favor of placing them on the Island of Malikou [Molokai] in a big cantonment guarded by the Army.
This was the plan urged by Knox.
Kalākaua's world tour - Wikipedia
I pointed out the difficulties of this so far as I could. The matter was left unsettled. On 27 March, after the Hawaiian commander had been formally notified about the evacuation plan that the President had approved and after a visit of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy to Hawaii, General Emmons made a "present estimate" of 1, as the number of dangerous Japanese aliens and citizens that should be evacuated and interned on the mainland, although he added that future circumstances might make it "advisable to raise this estimate to much larger figures.
McCloy had learned that Army and Navy offi-  cials in Hawaii were opposed to any large-scale evacuation to the mainland or to one of the outlying islands. The Army and Navy preferred, he reported, "to treat the Japanese in Hawaii as citizens of an occupied foreign country. He believed a mass evacuation to the mainland almost as impracticable, because of the lack of shipping, the necessity of replacing the Japanese labor force, the difficulty of providing enough suitable facilities for relocating the Japanese on the mainland, and "the political repercussions on the West Coast and in the United States generally to the introduction ofmore Japanese.
McCloy as stating that a mass evacuation of the Japanese from Hawaii was impractical and was not contemplated. By the beginning of Aprilboth Mr. McCloy and the Army's Operations Division appear to have assumed that the evacuation would be confined to the 1, "dangerous" Japanese specified in General Emmons' latest recommendation. On 20 April Mr. Knox renewed his plea for "taking all of the Japs out of Oahu and putting them in a concentration camp on some other island"; and the President himself continued to favor the same solution.
Knox-agreed that it was impracticable to move the Oahu Japanese to another island, and that instead General Emmons should be authorized to evacuate ten or fifteen thousand adult male Japanese to the mainland.
This idea had been suggested much earlier by Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who attended the meeting, and who was as strongly opposed as General Emmons to the outlying island proposal.
McCloy advised General Emmons that he had better work  out some alternative evacuation plan, perhaps similar to that proposed by Admiral Bloch, in order to satisfy the President and Mr. For more than a year the task of guarding the islands had been shared by the th and th Infantry Regiments, Hawaiian National Guard units that had been called into federal service in By late many of their enlisted men and some of their officers were of Japanese ancestry.
When sufficient replacements from the mainland finally arrived in May, the Hawaiian Department withdrew the Japanese troops from the th and th Regiments, organized them into a provisional battalion, and on 5 June shipped them to the mainland. This group of 29 officers and 1, enlisted men thereafter became the tooth Infantry Battalion, which eventually landed on the Salerno beachhead in Italy on 22 September The Hawaiian Department, which by 1 July considered the position and conduct of the bulk of the Japanese population "highly satisfactory," wanted to evacuate "as soon as practicable" only 5, not 15,; but the figure of 15, was used in a new joint Chiefs of Staff and Presidential directive of 17 July.
Although the War Department continued its planning and arranging for an eventual reception of 15, Japanese, Army officials in Washington realized that a movement of that size was now unlikely. By the latter month everyone had agreed that this movement should cease, and on 2 April the War Department instructed General Emmons to suspend evacuation to the mainland until and unless the number of his internees exceeded the capacity of the Hawaiian Department's own facilities for internment, which never happened.
By 12 December the War Department had arranged to ship from San Francisco some 7, men, more than crated pursuit ships, 3, rounds of the scarce caliber. On the evening of 13 December the Army had 2 fast transports loaded and ready to go, but the Navy refused to let them leave without escort. They finally sailed with 3 slower ships on the 16th, and reached Honolulu five days later-but only a fortnight after the Pearl Harbor attack.
A second and larger convoy of ii ships departed from San Francisco on 27 December and arrived in Hawaiian waters on 7 and 8 January Together these convoys brought about 15, more troops to Oahu, and the unit reinforcements included two regiments of infantry, one regiment each of field artillery and coast artillery, and light tank, signal, and railway artillery battalions.
With their arrival the strength of the Hawaiian Department was increased to about 58, officers and enlisted men, and it now had most of the heavy bombardment and pursuit strength allotted a month earlier. Despite a continued serious shortage of  antiaircraft weapons, the second week of January found Oahu generally well secured against invasion.
The Navy contended that the sure defense of the Hawaiian area depended primarily on Army air power and that the security and effectiveness of that air power required its dispersion among the major islands of the Hawaiian group. Secondly, while the immediate reinforcement of December might ensure against a direct attempt by the enemy to invade Oahu, the Japanese had the naval strength to cover an invasion of one or more of the almost undefended outer islands.
From bases on these islands the enemy could attack and possibly starve out Oahu. These arguments led to an inquiry to General Short about his plans for garrisoning the other islands of the Hawaiian group. As of mid-December, ail he planned to do was to distribute another National Guard infantry regiment among them and add to their defenses a few more second-class weapons the best being kept for Oahu. He also Wanted fillers to bring Oahu's units up to war strength as soon as possible-the combined strength of the 24th and 25th Divisions then being no more than 15, men.
And he wanted to build up the Hawaiian Air Force to a strength of heavy bombardment planes and pursuit ships. On 23 December General Marshall orally approved the immediate dispatch of one square division, two more antiaircraft regiments, and 10, additional service troops to Hawaii, and by the end of the month the War Department had established an eventual strength ofground and 16, air troops for the Hawaiian Department, exclusive of its distant appendages.
But with the arrival of the 27th Infantry Division in March and April and its deployment with supporting forces among the outer islands, the invasion threat to them really ended, and it ended before the enemy again approached the Hawaiian area in force. One was the reiterated request of General Emmons, strongly backed by Admiral Nimitz, for a much higher heavy bomber strength than Washington had allotted.
The Navy wanted as many Army heavy bombers as possible stationed in the Hawaiian Islands in order to free the fleet for limited offensive action to the southwestward, and it also wanted to be able to draw on a reservoir of Army bombers to support its offensives.
General Emmons wanted enough heavy bombers to maintain a striking force equipped to deal effectively with an enemy attack by six carriers, this force to be over and above the number of heavies needed for continued Army participation in long-range reconnaissance.
The other factor was the open distrust of a large segment of the Hawaiian population of Japanese descent, which, as already related, had led to demands in Washington that the Army cleanse the Hawaiian Department of its soldiers of Japanese descent and take other actions to put the Japanese population under close control.
As this was being done General Emmons was further disturbed by the detachment in early February of twelve of his heavy bombers for duty in the southern Pacific-and thereafter until late in May his bomber command remained at no more than one-third its allotted strength in heavies. As a seemingly necessary corollary to this assurance, the joint Chiefs had simultaneously recommended to the President that the bulk of the Japanese population of the Hawaiian Islands be evacuated to the United States mainland.
On the other hand, his approval of the planned strengths of Hawaiian ground and air forces constituted the  strongest kind of backing for completing the Army reinforcement that had been projected.
The garrison of the Hawaiian Department as approved by the joint Chiefs and the President was to consist of 74, ground troops on Oahu, 13, on Hawaii, and 12, distributed among five other islands. With small additions during March, the authorized strength of the department became at the beginning of Aprilground and 16, air troops, including replacements for all soldiers of Japanese descent; and the department reached these strengths before the end of June The Army air units to be retained in the islands for local defense were to contain 96 heavy and 24 medium and light bombers and pursuit planes, and the Navy was obligated to keep 67 patrol planes on hand for long-range and local reconnaissance.
Because Army officials in Washington were wary of Navy claims on heavy bombers that might be present in Hawaii, it took the impetus of a new and grave Japanese threat to get the planned increment of them out to the islands; and their number was quickly reduced after the Japanese challenge had been met.
Only the slower ships were used on the Hawaiian run to carry supplies for the Army and the local civilian population, and for several months a shortage of them led to a pile-up of supplies in San Francisco.
In contrast, the Navy got its supplies to Hawaii during the first months of the war with little or no difficulty. By April this system was working smoothly, and the backlog of Army supplies awaiting shipment in San Francisco had been substantially reduced.
After March General Emmons was more concerned about the continued shortage of civilian labor in Hawaii, including dock workers, than about the shipping shortage. In any event his early exasperation over shipping difficulties had already dissolved when the War Production Board in Washington circulated a colorful but not very well informed report on the situation. For the record, in a note to Admiral Nimitz, General Emmons cate-  gorically denied most of the charges contained in this report, and he assured both the admiral and the War Department that he was well satisfied with the way his supply problems were being solved.
He was particularly impressed by the intensive improvement of Army airfields since the Pearl Harbor attack. But he noted that the Army clearly lacked enough bombers to constitute an effective striking force against enemy carriers and that the long-range reconnaissance patrol was far from being air tight.
McCloy's judgment the Pearl Harbor-Honolulu area still presented a "terribly congested" and "most vulnerable" target. Two Japanese flying boats starting from Jaluit Island in the Marshalls had refueled in a rendezvous with three submarines at French Frigate Shoals and then flown on to Oahu, about miles to the southeast.