Once decentralization and the growth of market alternatives have freed For most scholars, civil society also refers to non-economic limits on the state. inequality and a change in state–market–civil society relations similar to the . This swift economic development is partly attributed to China's prioritisation of. institutions which serve public purposes and do not fit the state-market dichotomy . 2 .. links civil society ·to the state and his interpretation of civic as~ociations perform the . such as China and Vietnam could be achieved only after fulfilling.
The breakthrough point Deng Xiaoping chose in instituting reform was to introduce a competitive market economy by separating its economic and administrative functions, and implementing the contract system of responsibility with remuneration linked to output. In addition, China introduced a modern enterprise system in the cities and separated government functions from enterprise management.
After this, the Party and government no longer directly managed enterprises, and enterprises became legal persons and made their own management decisions.
The second step was to restructure the relationship between the state and society.
- Restructuring the Relations between the State, Market and Society in China
A relatively independent civil society began to emerge. This was a breakthrough development in grassroots democracy, and also an important advance in the sharing of powers between the state and society.
After a new round of government agency reform in the s, a number of government agencies were transformed into industrial associations; for example, the Ministry of Light Industry was transformed into the China Light Industry Association, and the Ministry of Textile Industry was transformed into the China Textile Association. At the same time, a number of management functions originally carried out by the government were transferred to these industrial associations, which was an important step in occupational self-governance.
In the late s and the beginning of the 21st century, large numbers of civil organizations appeared and the government began to change its attitude from a negative attitude of prohibition to a positive attitude of encouragement. The government also began to allow them to participate in social governance, and it delegated some state powers to designated social organizations.
The third step was to restructure the relationship between the market and society.
Introduction: States, Markets and Society – Looking Back t | Leach
The implementation of a market economy and the rise of civil society quickly brought a new question to the fore: On the one hand, market activities made significant inroads in a number of areas in the public arena, such as compulsory education, charitable aid and public health, which quickly led to the commercialization of society, the appearance of a new education crisis, and a crisis in credibility and ethics.
On the other hand, both the government and society excessively interfered in enterprises and the market in the name of public interest and social responsibility, which imposed a heavy social cost on enterprises that many could not bear. It became very important to draw a boundary between enterprises and society. Starting in the late s, China began adopting ways of defining the relationship between the market and society.
For example, a new system of social responsibility for enterprises was established, and enterprises were no longer required to perform excessive political-social functions. Restructuring the relationship between the government, the market and society is, in fact, a kind of political governance transformation. On the one hand, the Chinese government constantly reiterates that it will not slavishly follow the Western political model of multi-party competition, general elections and the separation of the three powers; and on the other hand the Chinese government stresses political reform, particularly the reform of state governance.
If you look at Chinese politics over the last plus years solely from the perspective of multi-party competition, general elections and the separation of the three powers, you could well conclude that nothing has changed. However, if you look at it from the perspective of state governance, you will discover that Chinese political life has undergone tremendous changes during that time. For example, in terms of the rule of law, public participation, democratic decision making, social governance, public services, government accountability, political transparency, administrative efficiency, government approval procedures, decentralization and the development of social organizations, we can see enormous changes and a clear direction: There are three important findings we can reach in the process of restructuring the relationship between the government, the market and society since Reform began.
First, the structural foundation of modern society is the differentiation between the political, economic and civil system. In pre-modern society, the government, the market and society were intimately integrated; there was no clear boundary between political, economic and social systems; civil society and economic society were obliterated by political society, and the state controlled everything in society. However, after the human race entered the modern age, society began to be segmented into three mutually independent realms: The relationship between each constitutes the structural foundation of modern society and determines the relations of modern society.
The factors span the triad of state, market and society, and often involve alliances between them.
Inclusive and participatory approaches to innovation can valuably draw on the everyday knowledge and creativity of citizens and civic society — a theme that Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson pick up in the context of Nepal in their article later in this IDS Bulletin.
They propose innovation as a distributed activity where communities can innovate and organisational structures are built on local knowledge. Particular opportunities and challenges in this respect relate to technologies and investments promoted by the so-called rising powers in low-income countries, such as through Chinese and Indian investments in African agriculture.
The interactions between firms and local actors seem to be key in whether or not such technology investments are able to build local capability that contributes to the creation of livelihoods at the level of the domestic firm or farm.
Yet further questions concern how far small and medium enterprises and small-scale farmers can upgrade and link into the emerging global value chains potentially being led by the rising powers. As the conference debates underlined, critical questions concern the political economy of innovation, and how to ensure that the process is not only inclusive for all actors, including the poor and marginalised, but actually creates structural change that leads to growth and development outcomes that are more broad-based.
Intertwined human and natural processes, accelerating especially since the s as a result of shifting and intensifying patterns of production and consumption, as well as market neoliberalism has undervalued nature, and produced deeply unsustainable development pathways.
Environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, land degradation and disease emergence are all interrelated, and affect everyone — locally, nationally and globally. The current and future development era must be an era of sustainable development Schmitz and Scoones ; one in which 'green transformations' in society and economy are required Scoones, Leach and Newell Sunita Narain opened this theme with a plenary talk, included as a short opinion piece in this IDS Bulletin, which lays out the challenge of unsustainable growth and its relationship to increased inequality and marginalisation, leading to an insecure future.
She underlines that sustainability and in equality are inextricably linked, and addressing one without the other will be ineffective. The vivid illustrations she draws from urban India confirm that 'solutions have to work for the poor if they are going to work for the rich'.
Following this opening, four dynamic panels discussed the intersection of states, markets and society in accelerating sustainability. Ramy Lotfy Hanna's article draws from these, offering arguments and evidence of the roles of market-led, state-led and citizen-led processes in transformations to sustainability. A particular focus is how alliances in favour of sustainability transformations are forming between state, market and civic actors, and the processes holding these together. Yet as shown in conference case studies around issues such as water and sanitation in India, renewable energy in Kenya, and agriculture in Argentina, within each part of the state—market—society triad there are forces that are against, as well as for, positive change.
Understanding and engaging with these politics is essential in building green transformations. As Hanna's article indicates, conference discussions also focused on the capitalisation of nature, exploring the unexpected alliances between NGOs, private investors, conservation entrepreneurs and states in commodifying and financializing ecosystems, carbon and biodiversity for sale in international markets.
This contemporary phenomenon, based on extending neoliberal ideas and institutions into nature, nevertheless requires state and civil society alliances in its operation. The result can, however, be the undermining of ecosystem processes that are actually vital for sustainability, while such marketised 'green growth' approaches can all too easily become 'green grabs' that dispossess local land users and contribute to inequality Fairhead, Leach and Scoones Across the conference deliberations, a recurring theme was that sustainability is being constructed in different ways in different contexts, with implications for who gains and who loses.
Such versions of sustainability — and the pathways towards or away from them — also depend very much on the politics of a particular place; in transformations to sustainability, there is no one-size-fits-all.
Examples from Nepal, Mexico, Brazil, Tanzania and Kenya highlighted the need to make the global goals meaningful in national and local settings. In meeting the pressing challenges of implementation, citizens and businesses have roles to play, but commitment by governments — and their accountability to the public in delivery — is critical.
Key discussions addressed the extent to which institutions are able or not to update themselves to be fit for purpose, the actors which influence them most and to whom they are accountable. Across a range of issues, from taxation to global governance, two overriding questions emerged about the character of institutions for a new development era. How are institutions shaped? And how are they made accountable? Both these themes are picked up in Rachel Godfrey-Wood's article in this IDS Bulletin, which addresses in particular the politics of institutions in meeting the challenges of climate change.
A recurring theme is the acknowledgement that institutions are not free-floating, and are themselves the products of interventions by particular actors. As Godfrey-Wood's article emphasises, even institutions which are frequently assumed to be pre-existing, such as markets, are in fact outcomes of interventions, meaning that more attention needs to be given to the actors who have brought them about and who exert decisive influence over them.
Much conference deliberation emphasised the dangers of 'capture' of key institutions by elites: However, while there was broad agreement over this, there was less consensus over the types of actors who are more likely to have both the strength and will to ensure that institutions are pro-poor and democratic. This question of how institutions are made accountable loomed large in the conference discussions.
Some speakers emphasised the importance of social movements and civil society organisations in holding powerful actors to account, such as tax campaigners in Uganda who collected 4.
At the same time, others pointed out the importance of local-level bureaucrats, who can have surprisingly high leeway for defining the role of the state in the provision of health care, as is the case in much of rural China. Others still emphasised the re-emergence of 'strongmen' leaders in the 'developmental patrimonialism' of Ethiopia and Rwanda.
This raises the question of path dependency, and whether or not particular conditions are likely to facilitate the emergence of some actors but not others, or whether on the other hand there is more margin for agency than is often assumed.
Here, a series of panels explored the contemporary nature of civil society engagement in both rhetoric and reality. A strong convergence of debates between North and South reflected the universalist perspective on development pervading the conference, and again underlined the value of comparison and cross-learning across countries.
As one participant put it: This is an opportunity for civil society more generally — how do we change power dynamics in our own country? On the one hand, formal spaces for civil society voice and participation are closing in many spheres; a phenomenon also explored in Evelina Dagnino's article in this IDS Bulletin.
Threats to civil society organising are being felt very keenly in many countries, whether in official moves to quell advocacy or in increasing government control of mainstream media. In other contexts, civil society organisations are being co-opted by state or business interests. Discussions identified many of the failings of conventional 'civil society', understood as NGOs, whether local, national or international, in achieving progressive change that addresses global challenges.
On the other hand, we are also seeing the emergence of alternative means to represent citizen voice and claims. Sometimes this is through 'unruly politics' and protest; sometimes through informal spontaneous forms of community organising and advocacy, and sometimes through social movements and their networks, extending from local up to national and global scales.
As Faith and Prieto-Martin explore, digital technologies and social media occupy vital but ambiguous places in these new politics of citizen engagement, offering important opportunities to open up space but also selective in which voices are represented. Meanwhile, it is important to be aware of how unruly politics and digital spaces are used, not just in the service of progressive forces to redress inequality, sustainability and security, but also by extremist groups with quite different aims.
This ambiguous moment for the 'society' part of the triad highlights important agendas for future analysis and action. There was also discussion of how to reconfigure and reinvigorate alliances between localised and Southern-based movements, and Northern and international NGOs and civil society — without 'sucking the oxygen out' of vibrant, engaged local politics.
The theme of alliances looms large in the final set of articles. These draw from plenary talks at the conference to reflect more broadly on changing state—market—society relationships in development in current times, and for the future.
Each looks back to look forward. And each offers powerful arguments and illustrations of the potential of new alliances in tackling challenges such as inequality, sustainability and inclusivity — yet also some important words of caution. Luka Biong Deng Kuol's article offers an insightful comparison between global changes over the past 50 years, and those in the USA during the decade known as the 'Roaring Twenties'.
Both, he argues, saw reactions to economic downturn followed by trends that saw increasing aggregation of wealth for a small proportion of the population. He argues that the relative roles of the state shaping development pathsmarkets the 'Washington Consensus' and neoliberalisation and society the rise of global civil society and social movements to prominence over the last 50 years have produced a development paradox, in which massive increases in global economic growth and technological innovation have coincided with rising global wealth inequality, and divergence in prosperity and development outcomes.
Yet, he suggests optimistically that new public—private—civil society alliances and hybrid forms of governance hold the potential for 'fairer global governance, checking greed and achieving equitable growth' in the future.
In his article, Michael Edwards warns against confusing such alliances with the blurred and blended institutions that are now becoming popular in development discourse — as donors, business leaders, philanthropists, consultants and commentators emphasise the potentia of social enterprises, and social and impact investing. He sees this as an extension of the ideological turn towards the market that began in the late s, 'now being supercharged in the softer language of blending and blurring'.
In practice, he argues, such blended institutions are actually less numerous and significant than many imagine. Moreover, they carry dangers, as blurred boundaries can all too easily mean blurred accountabilities. History shows us that alliances work best when government, business and civil society work as equal and complementary sets of institutions that can hold each other in mutual, constant and creative tension, rather than when they mix and merge their identities.
New opportunities for radical innovations in society and economy are certainly emerging, but to make the most of these, he urges a move 'back to the future' by re-emphasising the differences between government and civil society and their autonomy from each other, even as they enter into alliances with business and the market.
Evelina Dagnino's article focuses on another contemporary reaction to neoliberalism — the resurgence of arguments for strong states in shaping development. Emerging strongly in several Latin American countries and with diverse echoes in other parts of the world, from Ethiopia and Rwanda to Chinathe discourse and practice of the 'new developmentalist state' has much in common with the older 'developmental states' of s and s development thinking — but are more than ever now expected to coexist with and regulate strong markets.
In countries such as Brazil, the new state developmentalism has certainly helped in tackling poverty and inequality, and in promoting social exclusion. However, it has come at a cost to state— society relations, undermining and overturning several decades of innovation in participatory democracy, the involvement of citizens in public policy decisions, and institutional models to promote such engagement.
Instead, there is a re-emerging conception of the state as a self-sufficient entity, in which citizen participation and voice are reduced to mechanisms of representative democracy such as votingmany of which are dominated by elites.
State, Market and Society Relations: The Roaring Last Fift | Biong Deng Kuol
Finally, the article by Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson links this question of the appropriate balance between state, market and societal forces to the politics of knowledge. With a focus on Nepal's recent experiences of development, they take the locally salient notion of dharma as a lens to suggest that the balance of complementary forces is off-track. This is partly because, they suggest, each element is distorted: Intersecting with this problem is the disjuncture between what they term 'eagle's eye' views of development from the top down, and how everyday realities on the ground are experienced by Nepal's diverse populations.
Understanding these requires a different, bottom-up 'toad's eye science' attuned to and grounded in ethnography, citizen knowledge and lived experience. Development paths and progress, and the rebalanced state—market—society triad to achieve them, must, they suggest, be defined, assessed and evaluated in ways that include such toad's eye views — requiring a different politics of knowledge in development and by implication, development studies.
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To quote Michael Edwards' article, 'Traditionally… government, business and civil society were seen as different but equally valuable parts of a healthy whole, complementary but necessarily separate from each other'. He suggests that this model is 'so unfashionable today that it is seen as retrograde or even irrelevant', yet in various forms it was the framework that underpinned shared prosperity in many parts of the world.
As many articles in this IDS Bulletin have documented, in broad-brush terms the over-dominance of market forces with respect to the others, through the neoliberal period of the s onward, accounts for the rise of many of the challenges we see today — growing inequalities, environmental degradation, exclusion of marginalised groups and rising insecurities, with all their consequences for development.
So the question arises, is this triad still relevant to tackling these challenges in the future, and what new roles and relationships are emerging, and will be required?
Across the articles here, the answer to the first question is a resounding yes — this remains a highly relevant framework. But in different ways all suggest a rebalancing, to give — in both development discourse and practice — greater weight and influence to state and societal forces with respect to those of the market. The question of new roles and relationships is inevitably more complex, and the conference deliberations and articles here document numerous dilemmas and ambiguities, as well as clear directions.
Much depends on the issue in question, and on the embedded configurations of power and institutions in different places that shape what is possible, and indeed imaginable. What is clear is that in the context of emerging global challenges such as the triad of inequality, unsustainability and insecurity, a vibrant set of agendas for development research and action is emerging.
What new alliances and relationships between states, markets and society will enable the meeting of future development challenges, locally and globally? The articles in this IDS Bulletin and the conference debates prefigure some of the specific questions that such an agenda must address, and begin to answer them.
They also suggest some crosscutting themes, which will need to guide future agendas. One is the importance of transformation. Beyond the focus on quick fixes whether technological, or in the market that have dominated much of the last few decades of development thinking and practice, evident is a renewed emphasis on deep structural changes in economy and social relations to meet the extent and depth of global challenges.
A second is diversity. The theme that 'one-size-does-not-fit-all' recurred, suggesting that development must be re conceived as a matter of plural pathways towards plural goals.
A key challenge, though, remains how to connect micro-diversity plausibly and effectively with questions of macro-structural change; to relate global challenges to diverse local experiences and vice versa. Third is the emergence of uncertainty and complexity as key features of a contemporary and future world beset with shocks and stresses, whether associated with climate change, conflict, financial crisis, epidemics or more.
Conference discussions drew out how planning blueprints and mainstream control-focused approaches flounder amidst such uncertainties, requiring analyses and action geared more to building resilience and adaptability in turbulent times. Fourth, and perhaps most fundamental of all, is the importance of power and politics. Debates about the relationships between states, markets and society are fundamentally debates about the politics of development. An analysis of power infused the conference debates, whether seen in material terms or discursive ones; in approaches emphasising political-economic structures, or those attending more to political agency and power relations.
Political analysis of states, markets and civil society has infused the work of IDS and its partners since its origins, and must continue to do so in the future, in ways attentive to power's shifting configurations and guises. This in turn will require approaches that are both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary, integrating high-quality research with the knowledge of people working in state, business and civil society organisations; that mobilise evidence for impact, and that are international in their partnerships, linking global understandings with local contexts and the perspectives of people on the ground.
Indeed, the anniversary conference itself, with its mix of participants from diverse international settings, academia, and policy, practice and activist backgrounds, exemplified this type of integration — and the approach that we now term 'engaged excellence' at IDS.
In such ways, I hope that the conference and this IDS Bulletin have charted some contours of a future map of development studies, in a new era. Notes 1 The archive, which was opened for the 50th Anniversary year, makes available online and in fully Open Access form the entire back catalogue of the IDS Bulletin since the journal's foundation in World Bank Colclough, C.
Clarendon Press Cornia, G. Clarendon Press Edwards, M. A New Appropriation of Nature?