Yeah,” said candidate Dan Butler, who does not perform marriages. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette logo The East End judicial district is a liberal bastion and former magisterial district judge Hugh McGough presided over one of. "Some people think it's the end of the business district, but really it's just the beginning serving Deeper Roots Coffee, that promotes relationships and quality over down the road the Cookie Tour ends at the block of Butler Street where. Speech given at the University of Pittsburgh on May 13, My relationship with Wes Posvar is one of the threads that traces the evolution of the path and at the end state of a presumptive nuclear weapons free world.
Neither brewery views the other as a rival but recognizes that the other can help drive the market.
The breweries themselves are quite different. Reclamation has a neighborhood pub feel if the neighborhood pub happens to brew their own beer. Decorated in eclectic artwork, the bar area is dimly lit by dangling Edison bulb pendants. At the far end from the entry is the Reclamation RB logo made entirely from bottle caps. The brewing area is squeezed between the front of house and the kitchen and contains minimalist brewing equipment.
General George Lee Butler University of Pittsburgh Speech
Along with a selection of their own craft, they have a full bar offering notably inexpensive cocktails. Their beer leans towards the more drinkable end of the IBU scale and their offerings are more accessible than most breweries.
Bottle cap design in the logo of Reclamation Brewing in Butler Butler Brew Works has a more industrial feel with its poured cement bar, metal art work and large glass windows showcasing four glimmering fermenters. They use a number of hops varieties to create different flavor notes within the same style.14 Signs It's Time To End Your Relationship - animated video
Though Butler is in their name, their ownership group which includes Tuttle and his partners Nate Troyan and Nick Fazzoni, plans to expand into a regional brand. Unlike many breweries closer to Pittsburgh, both Reclamation and Butler Brew Works have full kitchens with the former offering standard pub fare and the latter specializing in barbecue. While he has good relationships with a number of brewers and owners in the rest of the western Pennsylvania scene, Tuttle does feel cut off from the rest of the brewing culture sometimes.
Smith feels a bit cut off in terms of distance from the customer base more so than he does other breweries. However, he knows people can and will travel. But the way the average beer drinker is going out and pursuing craft beer they want to experience all those different options.
That is a responsibility that continues to move me very deeply, and indeed, it accounts for my presence this evening. I have brought with me another servant of the national interest whose contributions and sacrifices made a lasting imprint on my career and on the lives of thousands of colleagues with whom I served. My wife Dorene assumed the demanding obligations that derived from my duties with extraordinary grace and competence.
She left a lasting mark on the quality of life of military families. In our new life, she serves as a principal officer in our foundation dedicated to reducing nuclear dangers, and is my most trusted and valued advisor. I want also to acknowledge the University of Pittsburgh for organizing this conference to address the future role and mission of nuclear weapons. In my judgment this is the central issue of our age. I still find it near miraculous that we now live in an age where the prospective elimination of these weapons can be seriously addressed.
But, as I have made clear in my public remarks over the past three years, I am dismayed by how badly the handful of nuclear weapon states have faltered in their responsibilities to reduce the saliency of their arsenals.
The Very Legit Butler Beer Scene - The Point of Pittsburgh
It is not my intention tonight to reiterate the explicit concerns that underlie my dismay. Those concerns are spelled out in a series of five speeches that progressively develop my thinking as I have absorbed the arguments of my critics, devised alternative strategies for elimination with like-minded colleagues and reflected on the steadily eroding progress of traditional arms control approaches.
With respect to critics, I noted with interest that the convenors of this conference chose a negative formulation of its subject: That is useful if only because it serves as a reminder that proponents of abolition must be deeply mindful of the risks and obstacles that must be accounted for both along the path and at the end state of a presumptive nuclear weapons free world.
By way of introduction to my principal remarks, I will suggest that these difficulties and dangers are most often posited in terms of three key arguments. I will touch on the first two of these arguments briefly and the third at length.
But let me begin by noting that they all obscure an absolutely vital understanding. I came to appreciate early on in my long association with nuclear arms control that issues regarding risk reduction and prospectively abolition depend in the final analysis upon judgments about costs and benefits, both along the path and at the end state.
These judgments in turn depend upon a disciplined and continuing assessment or the security environment in which reductions might be taken, or state of abolition is to be maintained.
Too often, however, the risks of abolition are simply asserted as if they could not be adequately mitigated. This mindset ignores or discounts the stunning reality that the global security environment has already been profoundly transformed by the end of the cold war.
It also misses the point that this astonishing and wholly unanticipated eventuality was itself the product of both serendipity, such as the elevation to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, and the willingness of statesmen to work relentlessly toward reducing nuclear dangers even in the face of unrelenting tension.
As to the merits of these arguments, with respect to the first I would suggest that a world free of nuclear weapons but burdened with the knowledge of their possibility is far more tolerable than a world wherein an indeterminate number of actors maintain or seek to acquire these weapons under capricious and arbitrary circumstances.
The former is effectively a condition of existential deterrence wherein all nations are marginally anxious but free of the fear of imminent nuclear threats.
The latter is a continuing nightmare of proliferation; crises spun out of control and the dreaded headline announcing a city vaporized in a thermonuclear cloud. As regards verification, I need only to pause and reflect on the extraordinary progress we have witnessed in this arena since the superpowers committed themselves to reduce their nuclear arms, and then imagine what can be achieved when they finally commit themselves to their elimination.
I can equally imagine, having already 13een party to an instance of forcible denial, the regime of both sanctions and incentives that can be designed to severely penalize cheating and rewar13 compliance. That regime will become increasingly imaginable and attainable as the distant goal of abolition draws nearer and nearer.
Greater access to former Soviet archives continues to shed critical new light on the intentions and motivations of Soviet leaders. Certainly, there is no question that the presence of nuclear weapons played a significant factor in the policies and risk calculus of the cold war antagonists.
It may well be that once these weapons were introduced into their respective arsenals, nuclear deterrence was their best, and their worst, hope for avoiding mutual catastrophe. It is equally clear, however, that the presence of these weapons inspired the United States and the Soviet Union to take risks that brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. It was largely a bargain we in the west made nth ourselves. Arms control negotiations are in gridlock as the United States and Russia cling to doctrines and forces that are completely irrelevant to their post-cold war security interests.
Both nations are squandering precious resources at the expense of conventional military capabilities in growing demand and in the process of being steadily eroded. They have rendered moot their obligations under article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and thereby greatly diminished their moral capacity to champion its cause.
The price of this folly is of historic import. By exaggerating the role of nuclear weapons, and misreading the history of nuclear deterrence, the united states and Russia have enshrined declarations and operational practices that are antithetical to our mutual security objectives and unique defense requirements.
Worse, in this country, they have weakened our grasp of the power and the application of classic deterrence in an age when we stand preeminent in our capability to bring conventional military power to bear on our vital interests.
We continue to do so in the face of compelling evidence that nuclear deterrence was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.
The fog of fear, Confusion and misinformation that enveloped the principals caught up in the Cuban missile crisis could have at any moment led to nuclear annihilation. The chilling fact is that American decision-makers did not know then, and not for many years thereafter, that even as they contemplated an invasion some one hundred soviet tactical nuclear warheads were already in place on the island.
No further indictment is required to put the elegant theories of nuclear deterrence in perpetual question. But this lesson has been made time and again, in Korea, in Indochina and most recently in the Persian Gulf, successive presidents of both parties have contemplated and then categorically rejected the employment of nuclear weapons even in the face of grave provocation.
In sum, it is my profound conviction that nuclear weapons did not, and will not, of themselves prevent major war. To the contrary, I am persuaded that the presence of these hideous devices unnecessarily prolonged and intensified the cold war.
Lawrenceville "Joy of Cookies" Cookie Tour
And so we now find ourselves in the worst of all outcomes. Superpower postures are being largely maintained at cold war levels, at enormous expense and increasing risk. New entrants are elaborating primitive forces and so-called deterrent policies without benefit of the intricate and costly warning and control measures essential to any hope of crisis stability. Finally, new forces are coming into play as political pressure build to deploy ballistic missile defenses, as governments rise and fall, and as regional animosities deepen.
This is truly a dismal state of affairs. But it was not foreordained. Rather, it is the product of a failure of the worst kind in the realm of national security, that is, a failure of strategic vision.
I do not make that criticism lightly, because I have held responsibilities for anticipating and acting on the perceived consequences of strategic change at the highest levels of government. I want to dwell on that experience for a moment because it leads me to a precise explication of how I view nuclear abolition as a goal and as a practical matter in light of contemporary circumstances.
Ten years ago I was engaged in one of the greatest intellectual challenges of my military career: I was working under his guidance to redefine the roles, missions, organization and equipage of our military forces in light of what we both foresaw as the precipitous decline of soviet-style communism.
Having concerted our views on the broad-brush strokes of this new global canvas, it was then my task to fill in the details and present them for his consideration. I felt well prepared for this effort, having spent the previous two years engaged in intensive interaction with high level soviet officials. I had also invested an enormous intellectual effort to imagine how historic forces might re-emerge after the Cold War to shape the world security environment.
In my view, the revised strategic portrait I drew nearly a decade ago, amended by my conclusions during three subsequent years as commander of the strategic nuclear forces, is still largely relevant to the security tasks that presently confront us.
First and foremost, it was founded on the premise that the United States must continue to play the leading role in sustaining and extending global peace and stability.
Second, it posited that managing relations with a Soviet Union engaged in a sweeping transformation was by far our primary security interest, especially in its nuclear dimension. Third, it identified stability in the Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula as vital interests, which is to say that challenges to those interests must be met with immediate and overwhelming force. Fourth, it imagined that other smaller contingencies might arise requiring some form of American intervention with less robust forces and objectives.
General George Lee Butler University of Pittsburgh Speech
This broad global framework was tied to a highly detailed and rationalized force structure and organization that differed dramatically from the cold war era. It presaged a thirty-percent reduction in the size of the armed forces, a much more compact alignment, a premium on joint warfighting and a highly sophisticated equipage that would elevate warfare beyond the reach of any prospective opponent.
That vision of global leadership, security priorities and robust conventional forces was short lived. It began on a high and promising note.
Events in the summer of quickly proved the thesis that we would not tolerate a challenge to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf. Shortly thereafter, president bush took a series of unilateral steps that dramatically advanced the purposes and the prospects of nuclear arms control.